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INTRODUCTION* 
The night of October 25, 1938, the Popular Front came to power 
in Chile under the aegis of Pedro Aguirre Cerda. Twenty-six years 
later, the Christian Democrats won the Presidency as the nation united 
behind Eduardo Frei against the far left represented by Salvador Allende. 
The year 1964 witnessed also the 25th anniversary of the Chilean Develop­
ment Corporation, CORFO, 
1 
the powerful semi-fiscal organization created 
in 1939 by the Popular Front to pursue its Development Program. 
Since the 25th anniversary of CORFO in 1964, the air has been 
filled again with the same commercial and economic philosophy that so 
strongly swept over the country a quarter of a century ago. After the 
years of the policies of Finance Minister Vergara and President Alles­
sandri at the end of the decade of the fifties, when the private sector 
was envisaged as the primum mobile and the state restrained itself to 
providing the stimuli necessary for growth, there has been a visible re­
turn to the Popular Front's philosophy that injections of public invest­
ment and extensive government intervention in the resource allocation pro­
cess are a sine qua non for accelerated economic growth. 
While the first wave of pro-government philosophy brought along 
CORFO, in the new setting of 1964-6; CORF0 1 s major finance and investment 
roles were to be both renewed and expanded. 
2 
As the country has embarked 
*The author acknowledges the cooperation of the officials of
CORFO and in particular by those working in the Financiai Section and\ the
Oil, Sugar Beet and Electricity subsidiaries. Most of the statistical,
information included in this pa2er has r.c,t been published before either
in English or in Spanish, but made available by these various officials.
This essay was written in Santiago, Chile, during the author's
leave of absence from Yale and association with the Institute of Economics
of the University of C~ile. Juan Crocco, Eduardo Garcia and Keith Griffin
have maye useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
This organization (Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n CORFO)
will be henceforth referred to either as CORFO or the Corporation. 
2rn spite of its renewed significance, government has transferred
the planning, national accounts and related research activities, which
were traditional functions of CORFO, to the Oficina de Planificacion de
la Presidencia de la Republica (ODEPLAN) (Planning Office of the Presidency
of the Republic). 
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on a new development effort with the same enthusiasm, but undoubtedly 
with more caution, experience and balance than in the year of CORFO's 
birth, a review and evaluation of CORFO's major activities is justified 
by a desire to unravel the mechanisms by which government has attempted 
to affect the allocation of resources and evaluate their effectiveness 
in an underdeveloped country and derive lessons for future policies 
both in Chile and elsewhere, Instead of covering all aspects of the 
Corporation's activities, we will, after a short historical review, con­
centrate on its major finance and investment activities, which appear 
to be of central significance. 
PART I 
Genesis and Growth of CORFO 
Although the strong earthquake of January 1939 provided the ex­
cuse for the establishment of the Chilean Development Corporation, the 
roots of CORFO are found in the prolonged and powerful depression that 
shook economy and economic policy alike in the early thirties. In the 
tradition of independence common both to Chileans and the Araucanian 
Indians, CORFO was a nationalist, Chile-focused institution. In spite 
of the fact that the Great Depression acted as a powerful shock upon 
the Chilean economy, it left intact the social and economic structure 
of agriculture, and also did not affect the foreign control over the 
mining sector, CORFO, which was created after production and employ­
ment had exceeded appreciably the levels of the depression, established 
as its goals the increase and diversification of output. However, it 
lacked both the intent and power to transform mining and agriculture in 
a way that would make them compatible with the new economic and social 
organization of the other sectors. 
The rather enthusiastic support given to CORFO at its inception 
(even the right wing conservatives that tried to boycott it found many 





forces. 1 The conservative right advocated nationalistic policies; 
the socialists welcomed government intervention; and the newly created 
class of engineers, technicians, and specialists favored industrializa­
tion schemes because they enabled professionals to gain power by 
entering into up-to-now closed terrains of the decision making process. 
In an era and country where the demands for change had become progressively 
stronger, it reflected the aspirations and hopes of the majority of the 
Chilean population. 
The philosophy that inspired its creation placed emphasis on 
2two tenets: the first advocated the need of an inward-oriented and 
nationally controlled self-propelling development effort. Its major facets 
were self-sufficiency and development of an economic system complete with 
11 all 11 sectors; the importance of the export sector was deemphasized, The 
second tenet related to the role and relative quantitative importance of 
the public sector. It stated that, in order to achieve the desired level 
and pattern of growth, the public sector would have to assume primary re­
sponsibility for action. Smallness of domestic capital markets, lack of 
1
The literature concerning CORFO is very scant and even then most 
of it unpublished. It includes The Chilean Develoement Corporation by 
Herman Finer (Montreal: The International Labour Office) 1947, 84 p.; 
Kalman H. Silvert, "The Chilean Development Corporation" 1952, unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, Tulane University, 173 p. which is a political science 
oriented research work that also provides useful economic insights. The 
Chilean Development Corporation (New York: Corporaci6n de Fomento de la 
Producci6n) 1962, 13 p.; Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n, Dis­
posiciones Legales (Santiago de Chile: Departamento de Fiscalia, CORFO) 
1959, 161 p. which contains all major laws concerning CORFO; 11 CORFO, Labor 
realizada entre los anos 1952-195611 mimeographed, 1957; "La Corporaci6n 
de Fomento de la Producci6n11 Chile, 1962, mimeographed, 30 p. which is a 
useful summary of the various aspects of CORFO; "Cuestionario sobre Plani­
ficaci6n Econ6mia preparado par el Nederlandsch Economisch Institute de 
Rotherdam, Rolanda, bajo la direcci6n de Jan Tinbergen11 This document• 
contains, in a mimeographed form, the questions submitted by the Tinbergen 
group and the answers given by CORFO; it also provides insights concerning
the state of economic planning by CORFO. The Panorama Econ6mico, a bi­
weekly semi-popular journal has occasionally published highly informative 
essays concerning CORFO and its subsidiaries. Panorama Econ6micg which 
carries the subtitle Review of Information and Polemics (Revista de Infor­
maci6n v Polemica) carried on June 4, 1954 a Sonderschrift on CORFO: Labor 
de 15 anos y Perspectivas (CORFO: 15 years of Work and Perspectives) 
No. 101. 
2It also placed emphasis on a third concept: the need to prepare 
a plan that would permit rational intervention and would introduce to the 








private Chilean entrepreneurship, and the high social desirability of 
major investments with low private rates of return (especially those 
involving the industrial infrastructure such as energy, power, steel 
and so forth) were advanced as the primary causes for the need of en­
larged government intervention. Government was imagined as the all­
powerful agent which would cure all existing defic4encies. The first 
notion led to long-run trade-aversion, the second to an apotheosis of 
the public sector. 
In accordance with clause (a), of article 25, Law No. 6640, 
CORFO was created to: 
Formulate a General Plan for the Development 
of Production, destined to elevate the standard of 
living of the population by taking advantage of the 
natural resources of the country and the lowering of 
the costs of production, and to improve the situation 
of the balance of international payments, bearing in 
mind, in establishing the plan, the necessary equilibrium 
in the development of mining, agricultural, industrial 
and trade activities, and at the same time aiming to 
satisfy the needs of the various regions of the country. 
As the principa 1 agent in the government's development efforts, it has 
acted as a financier, entrepreneur, investor, innovator and researcher, 
and frontierman. Through these roles, it has dominated economic life 
in Chile since 1939. It controlled the lion's share of the country's 
investment in machinery and equipment (more than 30 per cent in ten 
years, during 1939-1954), more than a fourth of public investment, and 
1as high as 18 per cent (in 1954) of gross domestic investment. Never 
before had the country witnessed the presence and intervention of such 
a powerful multifaceted government organization. 
The birth of C0RFO and its activities provide an example of 
contradictions. Launched by the leftist Popular Front it was approved 
by a conservative Congress. In a country that has a typical agricultural 
aristocracy, which up to recently controlled political life, it re­
presented a type of government intervention that would be regarded as 
excessive even in socialist England. 
1
For • detailed information concerning the relative importance 




Percenta6e of Investments Financed bi the Public Sector and CORFO 
% of Public Sector % of CQRFO in % of CORFO in % of CORFO in
in Gross Domestic Gross Domestic Total Public Machinery and
Investment, Investment. Investment, Equipment In-
vestment. 
1940 54.4 16.4 30.2 38.1
1941 62.6 17.1 27. 4 38. 5
1942 64.2 17. 0 26.5 44.5
1943 44.2 13. 1 29.8 40.9
1944 32.5 7.3 22.4 34.6
1945 36.4 6.3 17. 3 28.5
1946 22.9 4.0 17.5 20.0
1947 63.9 11.3 17. 6 14. 0
1948 32.7 10.9 33.3 32.7
1949 40. 9 14. 6 35.8 33.5
1950 41.2 17.2 41. 9 45.0
1951 44.1 12. 5 28.5 26.1
1952 49.6 16.2 32.7 32.0
1953 43. 1 11. 6 27. 0 40.3
1954 71. 5 18.4 25.8 43. 7
1955 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1956 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1957 n,a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1958 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1959 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1960 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1961 n.a. 6.7 n.a. n.a.
1962 n. a. 11. 0 n.a. n.a.
1963 n.a. 7. 1 n.a. n.a. 
n.a. = not available. 
SOURCE: Calculated from information in Cuentas Nacionales de Chile,
1940-1954 (Santiago de Chile: Editorial del Pacifico, S.A.
1957), Table 54. The figures for 1961, 62, 63 have been cal­
culated on the basis of unpublished information by CORFO.
The last column was calculated on the basis of information
given in tables VI and 54 of the Cuentas Nacionales. 
-6-
In the following table are presented the objectives of CORFO 
as regards economic policy; these coincide with the objectives of 
government in the late thirties and fall into three categories. 
Principal Objectives of CORFO 
Explicit Implicit Actual 
Raising the standard Augment Capital Forma­ Industrialization.
of living. tion. 
Maximum Import-Substitu­
Establishing Balance Raise Productivity. tion in the Industrial
of Payments Equi~ Sector (Excluding Pro­
librium. Promote Autarky and ducer Durables Produc­
Se !£-sufficiency. tion). 





Sources of Energy. 
The explicit objectives which are defined as goals contemplated in the 
organic law, include a higher standard of living and balance of payments 
equilibrium. Implicit objectives are defined as those the legislator 
would have expressed had he been an economist, or had the law been 
written today by an economist and include higher capital formation, 
especially in infrastructure, increased productivity, and self-sufficiency. 
Finally, actual objectives are defined as those that, as observed~ 
post, CORFO has pursued. In a broad sense, the single most important 
actual objective has been industrialization, and in a more narrow one, 
the substitution of industrial imports, excluding production of producer 
durables. 
In order to achieve these goals, CORFO resorted to "transitory 
socialism", which involved initial public ownership as an indispensable 
condition for removing specific bottlenecks, and was superceded by 
mixed or private ownership as the particular economic enterprises .were 
emancipated, and reached maturity, Public ownership was not the sole 
instrument used, but definitely the single most powerful one. CORFO 
has thus reflected short-run socialism, even though socialism was a 
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condition for long-run nationalistic capitalism and private enterprise. 
The "explicit" instruments employed by CORFO included receiving
credit in developed nationsJ thereby acting as an intermediary so that
such credit could reach domestic enterprises; engaging into basic re­
search; and extending low-cost credit. Some of the instruments which
it effectively usedJ although they do not figure explicitly, were infla­
tionary credit received by the Central Bank through Government; large
subsidies; and use of taxes originating from the Chi lean North and mining
sect.or to finance the investments of the industrial sector of the Center. 
The life cycle of CORFO can be divided into three periods. The
first one, which can be called the formative, started in 1939 and ter­
minated in 1950. 
It is the period of large-scale government ownership, during
which, and especially until 1945, the activities are principally of ex­
ploratory nature and concentrate on research, project studies, and
establishment of national accounts. Lack of trained personnel and 
statistical information prevented any serious work on planning. The 
activities of CORFO came to an actual standstill in the middle of the
decade of the forties when one of its major sources of fundsJ namely
mining taxes, dried up. During this period, but especially during the 
'second half, were launched the steel, oil, and electricity industries.
The economy prospered in spite of war shortages and the recessions of
1942 and 1947. The substitution of imports became a firmly established
policy and inflation became a permanent characteristic of the economy. 
The second period, which covers the years 1950-1960, was one of
transition. By 1950, CORFO felt that its research concerning·. national
accounts had reached a quality level that permitted a more direct and
active interest in production plans. The Planning Department was created
andJ by 1959, both aggregate and sectoral development plans had been pre­
pared. On the other hand, at the beginning of the decade mentioned,
CORFO started transferring some of the enterprises it controlled to the
private sector. 
1 
Once the steel industry had successfully proven its 
1
Although CORFO acquired funds in exchange for the shares itsold to the public, it lost through this exchange the most profitableenterprises and a major long-run source of income. 
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viability, it was turned over to private capital. In this epoch 
occurred, also, the important transition from the doctrines of un­
balanced to the philosophy of balanced sectoral growth. The change 
came out of necessity. In effect, in the first years of this decade 
were exposed the previous "planning" errors. Mining had stagnated, 
agriculture grew slowly, and inflation reached alarming dimensions. In­
dustry itself, which had been an important source of employment creation 
during the previous decade, started displaying excess capacity and, due 
to substantial productivity gains, added a negligible amount to employ­
ment. After all, steel, oil, and electricity, which absorbed a major 
share of investment, were very capital intensive industries. Severe 
balance of payments problems and stagnation of some sectors led to the 
"New Deal" Law which restored large-scale copper mining from a status 
of a "suppressed" sector to that of a sector receiving equal treatment. 
And, as part of the copper taxes were for the first time earmarked for 
the "mining" regions, an end was put to their up to then highly dis­
criminatory treatment. Overall economic stagnation towards the end of 
this period created .sn ambiance propitious to major changes in CORFO, 
the country, and the constellation of political power during the next 
period. 
The year 1960, when the third part of CORFO's life cycle started, 
marked the beginning of the "balanced growth" era. After more than 
twenty years of operation CORFO finally created the Gerencia Agricola 
in view of the special importance that CORFO is attaching to said 
1 
•economic activity11 The country and CORFO also started receiving 
large economic assistance from the United States. Today, there exists 
hope that the Christian Democrats will finally lift the economy to a 
level of accelerated growth. How this would be achieved is, neverthe­
less, not clear yet. 
1
Mimeographed review of CORFO's activities, 1964. 
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PART II 
Financing Economic Development 
CORFO has played a leading role as an institution financing 
economic development. The timing and rationale of its establishment 
led to immediate emphasis of its financial activities. In 1939, there 
existed a vacuum in the financial mechanism due to a shortage of in­
stitutions capable of financing long term investments. The urgent 
need to cure this deficiency led to the immediate transformation of 
CORFO, which had been endowed with capital and had as a function to 
promote long-term investment directly, into an institution responsible 
1of financing economic development. 
The financial activities of CORFO have included extension of 
credit both for working and investment capital; guaranteeing foreign 
loans to domestic enterprises; equity participation in both public and 
private enterprises; establishment of artificially low interest rates 
and favorable amortization, and so forth. In 1953, the Chilean De­
velopment Corporation absorbed the Tarapaca and Antofagasta Institutes, 
2 
thereby explicitly extending its financial activites to short-term and 
3intermediate credits. 
As a financial institution, CORFO can be best described as a 
filli generis investment bank: it is an investment bank because it is 
1
Even before CORFO specialized institutions provided generous 
and flexible short-term and intermediate credit facilities to the agri­
cultural, mining, and manufacturing sectors. These institutions never­
theless, which included the Agricultural Credit Institute, the Indus­
trial Credit Institute, the Mining and Industrial Development Institute 
of Tarapaca, the Mining and Industrial Credit Institute of Antofagasta, 
and the Agricultural Colonization Institute lacked the investment 
capital as well as the power to directly influence long-run growth. 
2
The Mining and Industrial Development Institute of Tarapaca 
and the Mining and Industrial Credit Institute of Antofagasta specialized 
in short and intermediate term credits to mining and industry. 
3CORFO plays a vital role in the financial mechanism of the 
economy. This mechanism is composed of development institutions (such 
as CORFO), banking institutions, social security institutions, in­
surance companies, and security exchanges and institutions. 
-10-
TABLE 2 
Investment Funds. by Type of Source. of the 
Chilean Development Corporation 
(Thousands of Escudos of Each Year) 
State 
Contri- External Income from Other Total 
but ions~ Credits own sources Sources Investments 
1939 105 73 
1940 176 43 194 413 
1941 239 101 147 487 
1942 157 117 253 527 
1943 148 215 144 507 
1944 162 162 95 419 
1945 199 70 3 179 383 
1946 107 17 5 3 277 451 
1947 466 127 7 562 
1948 710 674 33 28 1,445
1949 726 1,299 84 46 2,155
1950 847 772 169 43 1,831
1951 1,232 511 509 163 2,415
1952 1,845 1,136 839 3,490
1953 2,362 1,404 1,282 4,799
1954 3,180 1,938 2,004 879 8,001
1955 5, 8lt-2 4,299 5,293 166 15,600
1956 14,158 5,363 13,873 25,592
1957 10,275 7,838 20,696 4,619 43,428
1958 14,643 13,655 32,738 8,516 69,562
1959 33,123 6,731 40,536 80,290
1960 42,930 6,766 21,616 (-) 71, 312 
1961 56,910 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1962 68,296 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1963 87,327 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(-) Provisional figure. 
n.a. Not available 
Notes: The majority of the tables included in the present paper were 
origtnally expressed in millions of pesos, the currency that was 
replaced in 1959 by the escudo on a 1000:1 basis. 
Source: Department of Finance, CORFO. 
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the institution specializing in financing and undertaking long-term
investment; and it is sui generis for two major reasons: because it 
is run as a non-profit organization and because it dispenses its vast 
resources without applying the rules of traditional, profit motivated
investment banks. Furthermore, for its financial activities it has 
been receiving from government yearly capital contributions, has been
borrowing from foreign institutions and individuals, and has also 
utilized the income it derived from its own financial, investment, and 
other economic activities; but it has not floated its own liabilities,
created species or accepted deposits. These various types of funds 
are presented in Table 2. 
To understand CORFO as a financial institution it is necessary
to examine two basic facets of this organization. The first involves 
a description of the sources of funds at its disposition, which con­
stitutes the theme of the present section. lhe second includes a des­
cription of its investment activities and forms part of the third 
section. 
1. State Contributions 
Since it was a governmental instrument in industrializing the 
economy, CORFO received a generous share of the funds available to the
public sector each year. State funds were contributed in national 
currency and dollars. Normally, the first were destined for domestic
expenditures; the second served to facilitate amortization of liabilities
in dollars and the purchase of imported capital goods. The level of the
latter depended on the dollar taxes paid by the Gran Mineria which
were explicitly earmerked for CORFO, on the non-earmarked dollar tax
proceeds of the general government, and on the dollar needs of CORFO,
as compared to those of other government agencies. 
Until 1946, state funds were regularly earmarked for Develop­
ment, Investment, and Housing, and sporadically again in 1956 and 1958.
The table that follows contains information concerning the use of these
contributions. Development funds are reserved for administrative ex­
penses, costs of research, scholarship grants and, most important, the 
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TABLE 3 
Distribution of Government Cor;tributions by Obi ectives 






1942 2. 9 
1943 4.3 









1953 60. 8 
1954 7 5. 0 
1955 74.0 



































Source: Department of Finance of CORFO. 
of Each Year) 
Housing Total 
C A+B+C = D 
25.0 105. 0 
40.0 17 5. 7 
52.7 240. 7 
3.5 155.2 
20. 0 149. 3 
172. 9 











16. 0 5,367.3 
15,722.2 
23.5 16,845.9 
lt'f. 0 33,023.0 





1servicing of the foreign debt. Investment funds comprise the actual 
investment expenditures and include direct investments, as reflected 
in stock holdings, and loans. As revealed by Table 3, investment 
funds absorbed the major share of the appropriations. The investment 
activities in housing have been only incidental and occurred i.n the 
early years - 1939-1943 - in connection with the earthquake-induced 
housing program, and in the 1956-1960 period, when the price stabiliza­
tion policy reduced severely construction activities. In both instances, 
it reflected a temporary, emergency activity. 
A far more important classification of the government's contri­
butions, from the point of view of the relation between the activities 
of CORFO and income growth, is obtained if we use as a criterion their 
primary source. Then, three major categories are distinguished. First, 
contributions originating from taxes levied specifically to finance 
CORFO' s activities; second, general contributions from tax receipts not 
earmarked for CORFO; and, finally, contributions made possible by credits 
of the Centr,sl Bank of Chile extended to government and transferred to 
CORFO. 
The taxes assigned specifically to finance the activities of 
CORFO have been imposed almost exclusively on the Gran Mineria. They 
are classified into two groups: the taxes of the first group accrue 
to the general budget of CORFO and may be used as it chooses without 
any "strings attached". The 15 per cent tax on the normal profits of 
the large-scale copper mines is an example of this class of contributions. 
It was imposed in 1942 on the difference between an assumed cost of pro­
duction (which included a fair rate of return) and the actual cost of 
production; this tax was allocated to CORFO. The proceeds from this 
tax diminished rapidly from 167 million pesos in 1942 to 34 million in 
1947, as the actual cost of production approached the legally fixed 
2
assumed cost. These copper taxes contributed to a transfer of resources 
1
The Spanish term for "Investment" expenditures has been "Reali­
zation", which has been trans lated tnto English by CORl~O and others to 
the equally vague term "Fulfillment•·•. 
2For details see K. H. Silvert, "The Chilean Development Cor­
poration". Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Tulane University, pp. 86-91. 
_, 1~, -
,t~BLE-i 
~ification .of Government....£ontributions t_o CORFO 
(in thousands of escudos of each year) 
Copper Law 
Total Debit Entries Funds (Laws 
Contributions to State 10255 and 
,Xgfil: as per Budgets f.9.!?tributions -----]. 1828) 
1939 105.0 
1940 17 5. 7 
1941 240. 7 
1942 155.2 
1943 149. 3 
1944 172. 9 






1951 1,390.3 26.5 
1952 1,622.9 70. 5 
1953 2,553.2 267.2 
1954 4,598.3 87.9 300.6 
1955 4,424.9 781. 3 1,624.3 
1956 5,367.3 3,040.6 2,720.8 
1957 15,722.2 2,606n0 2,396.3 
1958 16,845.9 4,ll7.7 1,367.2 
1959 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1960 n.a. n.a. n.an 
1961 n.a. n.a. 6,408.2 
1962 n.a. n.a. 5,406.2 
1963 n.a. Ilo a. 8,482.0 
1964 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
n.a. = Not available 
Note: The various figures do not necessarily add up 
of rounding of the figures. 
Source: Department of Finance of CORFO. 
Actual Total Annual 
Contributions Cumulative 
including State 
Copper Funds Contributions 
105. 0 575.9 
17 5. 7 280. 7 
240. 7 521.4 
152.2 676.6 
149. 3 825.9 
172. 9 998.9 
204. 1 1,202.9 



















exactly to the total becauee 
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from the highly productive mining sector to industry in particular. 
They also led to a resource transfer from the mining North and O'Higgins 
province to the Center of Chile. 
The 11 copper funds 11 transferred to CORFO were used predominantly 
for investment but, unfortunately, reflected only a small fraction of 
taxes paid by the large American-owned copper mining concerns to the 
Chilean government. The other part of the resources which were trans­
ferred to the Center through the taxation mechanism were used mainly 
to cover current expenditures, and thus for consumption. 
A second group of taxes destined for CORFO had 11 strings attached". 
Well known, in this respect, is the tax that has led to the so-called 
Copper Law Funds (Laws 10255 and 11828), shown on table 4. These formed 
an integral part of the 11 New Deal" Legislation enacted in 1955 to give 
a II fair" treatment to the stagnant, foreign-owned mining. 
The legislators believed that mining was subject to highly 
discriminatory treatment, to which its stagnation was being attributed, 
and also that the unbalanced preoccupation of government with industry, 
at the expense of mining, was matched by an inequitable participation 
of the Center in the fiscal revenues to the detriment of the North and 
the O'Higgins province. It was thus prescribed that, starting in 1952, 
a fraction of copper proceeds would have to be spent in the major copper 
producing provinces of Tarapaca, Antofagasta and O'Higgins. The more 
equitable treatment of copper was thus accompanied by a balanced geo­
graphical allocation of tax revenues. 
As already mentioned, the fiscal contributions reflected tax re­
venues only partially. A significant portion corresponded to the 
use of credit received by the Government from the Central Bank. It has 
been impossible to obtain a quantitative measurement of this inflationary 
credit. The reallocation of resources achieved by means of "inflation" 
can be viewed, however, both within the public versus private expenditures 
framework, as well as within the framework of investment versus consump­
tion. The impact of such credit and of CORFO's activities on the rela­
tion between public and private use of resources is clear. The former 
received a substantial stimulus and increased. The picture is less clear 
with respect to the influence of the use of the Central Bank credit by 
CORFO on the relative importance of investment and consumption. The 
share of public investment in total investment rose, but there is no 
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evidence that this was accompanied by an increase in the share of in­
vestment in national product. Government intervention may have 
possibly contributed to higher consumption in the short run. The 
bidding away of skilled labor, usually in short supply, from the pri­
vate sector, raised its price to extraordinarily high levels for 
Chile. Within the public sector, high real salaries, especially in 
semi-autonomous institutions, diminished the share that government, 
in a broad sense, could allocate on capital expenditures. Furthermore, 
a high level of current consumption expenditures of the public sector 
became feasible over time only as long as the inflationary credit 
supported the real income of government employees. 
The social revolution that has elevated Chilean white collar 
workers to the special status they enjoy now had preceded the creation 
of CORFO but has been also reinforced by it. In the majority of coun­
tries, inflationary finance has signalled a sudden and unexpected misery 
of the middle classes, and, especially, the public servants. In Chile, 
to the contrary, inflation has markedly improved their economic status 
in absolute terms as well as relative to other income groups. 
2. Foreign Credits 
The most complete information available concerning the financial 
activities of CORFO relates to foreign credits received, which form its 
second source of funds. The statistics of the year-to-year volume of 
foreign credits received and utilized over the last twenty-five years 
appear in the table that follows. 
Foreign credits have been substantial and have contributed to­
wards the economic development of the country. They have been .applied 
to the financing of producing steel, electricity, cellulose, coal, 
sugar and so forth; to road building and irrigation projects; to im­
provement of agriculture, and to transportation of materials for rail­
ways and public transport. 
In order to obtain these funds, CORFO has acted predominantly 
on a State-to-State and State-to-International Agencies level. Thus, 
the majority of these credits have been subscribed with the Export and 
































Foreign Credits Received and Utilized by CORFO, 1940-1963 
(In U.S. dollars) 
Credits Received Part of these Credits Amortization 
Utilized 
US$ 
12,500,000 1,559,300 n.a. 
300, 000 3,099,500 n.a. 
5,300,000 4,100,100 
5,350,000 7,344,800 n.a. 
6,454,000 5,350,000 n.a. 
33,354,000 2,300,800 n.a. 
6,649,800 5,549,700 n.a. 
6,684,500 4,074,000 n.a. 
17,465,300 18,615,200 n.a. 
23,915,600 35,115,100 n.a. 
28,829,800 39,342,200 n.a. 
19,527,700 8,460;600 n.a. 
7,309,300 16,973,000 n.a. 
31,286,000 18,005,700 n.a. 
27,536,100 19, 244/+00 n,a. 
13,415,700 28, 096 /i 00 n.a. 
20,090,500 15,278,4-00 n.a. 
31,388,500 12,058,600 n.a. 





31,719,500 44,305,600 13,691,500 
435,920,466 366,818,007 202,722,300 
= Not available. 
The balance to be amortized was $232 million on December 31, 1963. 
Finance Department of CORFO. 
-18-
Development (I.B.R.D.); the Interamerican Bank (B.I.D.) and the 
Italian Emigration Institute (ICLE); and the Agency for International 
Development (AID). 
Furthermore, it has received credit from private suppliers 
it had contracted. Surprisingly, their majority has been Europeans 
and only a few from the United States. 
The marked dependence of CORFO on foreign credit was something 
natural for Chile. Since government was reluctant to impose onerous 
taxes on other sectors than foreign-owned mining, and since it ex­
plicitly desired to control inflation, foreign credit was converted 
into an instrument of last resort. Furthermore, the false argument 
that inadequate national saving was responsible for Chile's poverty 
has provided a permanent excuse for asking credit from the rich nations. 
The activities of CORFO as an intermediary between foreign 
creditors and domestic borrowers provide some fascinating insights into 
the process of international financial intermediation and the relation­
ship between international and domestic financing. 
The most striking aspect of the financial activities with 
foreign creditors is that they introduced a radical change into the 
normally "accepted" procedures of investment financing, and in the 
policy which CORFO was originally, legally or otherwise, expected to 
pursue. 
Implicitly, but unmistakingly, CORFO converted the "hard" for­
eign currency loans to enterprises or agencies, into domestic "soft" 
loans. This "policy" was the consequence of two events. With ram­
pant inflation and with CORFO lending without a dollar or other es 
calator clause, only a fraction of the real value of these loans has 
ever been repayed by the recipient enterprises. 1 
In theory, and also legally, it was supposed that CORFO would 
act as an intermediary between the foreign internationa 1 financia 1 
But ev~n when a dollar clause was introduced, as it did in 
many cases after 1960, repayments were highly irregular and rarely, 
if ever, insisted upon by the Corporation. Thus, even though price
stability might have reduced many problems, there exists no proof that 
it would have prevented CORFO from turning hard loans into soft ones. 
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Distribution of Forei?;;n Credits Received by CORFO, According to Source. 
(June 30J 1964) Provisional Figures in US$) 
Origin Amount of Utilization Unutilized Amortization Balance to 
Credits Balance US$ be 
US$ Amortized 
Eximbank 128,767)000 128J767JOOO 83J288J991 45 478 008 (l)J J 
International Bank l30J 154)456 81,296,238 48,858,217 22)426,000 107,728,456 
Interamerican Bank 28)790,000 12,515,843 16,274,156 494,098 28,295,901 
ICLE 1,201,510 1,201,510 772,386 429,123 
AID 40, ooo, 000 40, ooo, 000 40,000,000 
Suppliers 103,287,700 98)328,200 4,959,500 89,135,100 14, 152)600 
US$ 432J200,666(2)362,108,791 7 o, 091, 874 196J 116, 57 5 236 048 090(3)
' J 
Interamerican Bank E0 3J337,241 2,267)209 1., 070) 032 142,780 3)194,460 
Notes: To obtain the balance of credits to be repayed on the 10 .7.64) the column 
"Unuti lized Ba lance" should be deducted from the column "Balance to be Amortized". 
(1) Does not include ESANI (N° 809). 
(2) A detailed breakdown of credits received, utilized, and amortized by
CORFO exists for 1962 and 1963. In 1962J CORFO received a credit of 
$40 million from A.I.D. which was chanelled to the following institutions: 
The Society for the Construction of Hospital Establishments, the National 
Electricity Company, State Railways, the Society for the Construction of 
Educational Establishments, the Housing Corporation, Office of Irrigation 
(Ministry of Public Works), the Office of Architecture, Office of 
Sanitary Works (Ministry of Public Works)J the National Mining Company 
(ENAMI) and CORFO. The Corporation was thus acting as an intermediary 
between the United States Government and a wide range of public and 
semi-public institutions. 
(3) The minor discrepancy between the figures of the sum totals of this 
tab le and of tab le 5 is the result of the slightly more limited coverage
of foreign credits of the present table. 
Source: Finance Section of CORFO. 
-20-
institutions and national enterprises in a way that the terms intro­
duced in the transaction would be binding to both sides. In practice, 
CORFO was converted into an institution coordinating two separate 
actions of Government. The first of these consisted in obtaining re­
payable credits in hard curren:::y from foreign creditors and; the second; 
in using hard currency income of the Government to service and repay 
its own debts to foreigners, 
A double standard was introduced: one set of rules applied to 
the international aspect of a financial transaction, and another applied 
to the domestic aspect of the same transaction, The first was valid 
de jure, while the second set of rules was established de ~-
The first set of rules; which is evident in the international 
transactions of CORFO; made the recipient enterprise directly and the 
Corporation indirectly liable for the loan. It was stipulated that the 
loan was both to be made and be repaid in hard currency. Many of these 
loans have been already repayed, but the recipient enterprise has never 
contributed more than a fraction to the repayments, with government 
taking charge of the rest. In view of the fact that payments have been 
made it can be said that CORFO has complied with the first set of 
rules; however, these same rules were violated by the fact that a third 
party, namely government, rather than the recipients made these pay­
ments. As an example; credits authorized by Eximbank to landowners for 
the purchase of agricultural machinery, and to ENDESA (National Elec­
tricity Company) to import electrical machinery constituted legally 
an obligation of CORFO or ENDESA but in reality were converted into a 
Government liability, as they were paid by Government and only on rare 
occasions constituted a direct and real liability of the actual bene­
ficiaries. 
A second set of rules was developed by CORFO. It covered the 
domestic aspect of CORFO's financial transactions and both contradicted 
and violated the original set of rules. The recipient enterprise was 
not required to repay at all the international loan in dollars or in 
dollar-equivalent funds, Furthermore, the domestic "softness" of the 
external "hard" loan had a second angle. The recipient enterprise was 
not required to repay the loan even in local currency, in part or in 
toto; and such lack of payment never brought along bankruptcy or any 
similar punishment. It was also true that CORFO had no obligation to 
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repay such foreign debts by drawing on its own resources. Payment of 
CORFO's foreign debts has had little or no connection with the sol­
vency, profitability, or success of the debtor enterprise and has been 
related strictly to the government's ability to acquire directly 
(through copper taxation) or indirectly (through the Central Bank and 
international borrowing) sufficient foreign exchange to service its 
debts. 
Two successive transformations were performed by means of 
CORFO's financial intermediation. According to the first, a hard loan 
to an enterprise, where hardness reflected both the repayment require­
ment and the dollar nature of the loan, was transformed into a soft 
loan to an enterprise without the two requirements of "hardness". The 
second transformation, which was "parallel in reverse11 and at least as 
fascinating as the first, reconverted the soft loan into a hard one by 
turning it into a dollar liabi Htv of the country, 
This dual transformation process was carried on by CORFO up to 
the point where these "artificially created11 dollar liabilities of the 
government and the country could not be serviced any more either through 
dollar tax revenues or current dollar earnings delivered to the Central 
Bank, Chile reached a period of crisis during 1960-1962 and only the 
timely arrival of American aid prevented an external financial catas­
trophe. 
The implications of the mechanism that emerged have been per­
vasive. The individual investments sponsored by CORFO have been consis­
tently judged financially sound by the foreign financial circles involved; 
officially, because their approval followed careful scrutiny and analysis 
of the individual plans submitted; in reality, because government had 
guaranteed and, as experience revealed, paid for these liabilities 
through the Corporation. 
This anomaly, by means of which the burden of a firm was con­
verted into a burden of the whole economy, existed irrespectively of the 
nature of the investment of CORFO as one in debt or in equity, as long 
as the resources used by CORFO to repay these dollar liabilities ori­
ginated from sources other than the individual enterprises concerned. 
It is certain that CORFO incurred an immediate loss only in those in­
stances where investments were made in debt liabilities of enterprises, 
vulnerable to inflation. Lack of a dollar clause implied a subsidy to 
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the debtor equal to the difference between the dollar value of the invest­
ment plus ~he cost of servicing and the real burden of the debt to the 
individual, as determined by the rate of price increase and the money 
rate of interest. But even when equity investment was involved, the 
protection may have been a spurious one, since the profitability of the 
enterprise in relation to the capital market conditions did not permit 
CORFO to recover its investment by means of sale of the equity. 
In this financia 1 framework it is impossible to measure the 
success of foreign credits. The claim of CORFO that its own success 
can be measured by its excellent repayment record is unfounded, as it 
actually has' had no relation with the success of the recipient enter­
prises. To the contrary, the poor financial record of the recipients, 
as witnessed by their own limited repayments, suggests that a misalloca­
tion of resources is likely to have occurred. Foreign creditors con­
tributed to the establishment of these new rules of game, which ultimately 
could lead to a reduced ability of the economy to repay individual debts, 
by showing no interest in who paid, as long as debts were paid. 
Still, CORFO contributed to Chilean growth by means of additional, 
less spectacular financial and related activities. In negotiating for­
eign credits, CORFO adopted a sound policy of purchasing capital goods. 
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that CORFO established a favorable 
climate for foreign credits and foreign investments, especially in the 
field of manufacturing. In this respect, its New York office has per­
formed in a commendable manner in support of this policy. 
Another apparent contribution of CORFO lies in its ability to 
obtain low cost foreign credits. All credits carried interest payments, 
with credits by the Eximbank having the lowest charges (3% - 4%) and 
those by the European suppliers the highest (6% - 7%). What or how 
much the net gain has been to the economy has been impossible to estimate. 
Interest rates on foreign credits have been reduced as a result 
of the direct guarantees by CORFO and the indirect ones by Governments; 
this cost reduction may have been ficticious insofar as it emanated from 
a government induced resource allocation that has been inferior to the 
allocation that would have taken place without such government inter­
vention and, which is most likely, at higher interest costs on foreign 
credits. To the extent that the loss of real income, as a result of the 
intervention by CORFO and an induced resource misallocation, exceeded 
-23-
the economy's gain from lower interest rates, the contribution of CORFO 
may be exaggerated due to the association of low cost of borrowing with 
an inferior allocation of resources. 
Even though this may appear surprising 7 by obtaining foreign 
credits, CORFO accentuated _inflationary pressures through what may be 
called the complementarity effect of foreign credits. In most instances 
an investment project had a dollar (foreign credit).; a peso (domestic 
credit) component. Once foreign credit was obtained, the complementary 
need for domestic resources forced CORFO to resort to the Central Bank 
for the domestic expenditures component of the investment. This com­
plementary credit was given by the Central Bank to CORFO throughout this 
period, but especially during the first fifteen years. This credit 
directly contributed to inflation, especially if it is considered that 
these projects reached fruition after some years. 
As already mentioned, once in the possession of funds, CORFO ad­
ministered a credit-cum-subsidy program that had a highly unequal im­
pact upon sectors and enterprises. Subsidies were highest in the case 
of loans in national currency and lowest when CORFO controlled the equity. 
Whenever the debtor was an enterprise owned by CORFO the gain from the 
subsidy accrued,~~, to all factors of production employed by the 
public sector. However, most frequently, those who gained most were 
labor and, in particular, white collar workers. This view is supported 
1by the zero profit margins and negligible reinvestment levels by ENDESA 
and most other government owned enterprises. In such instances the sub­
sidy program resulted in real wages and salaries in the public enterprises 
exceeding productivity levels. 
2 
These subsidies became evident in later 
1
This picture has partially changed in recent years. As it is 
shown later in the discussion of ENDESA (electricity company) profit 
rates have been positive in recent years. 
2
Real wages and salaries exceeding productivity levels, a 
phenomenon quite prevalent in CORFO-financed enterprises, had an infla­
tionary impact also through the cost-push mechanism. These artificially 
high wages exerted a pull on wages in the rest of the industry or other 
sectors: the CORFO enterprise acted as a 11 wage leader 11 • The induced 
demand for higher wages and salaries by the employees of the non-CORFO 
industries led to a higher demand for credit, in order to cover in­
creased costs, and to higher prices in order to absorb increasing 
costs (cost-push). 
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years, when the real value of the effective payments to CORFO fell 
short of what it would have been without inflation. 
This subsidy program had two effects, one being strongly infla­
tionary. By reducing the real value of outstanding credits of CORFO, 
it impoverished it by the amount of the subsidy; it diminished the re­
lative significance of "recuperations" as a source of future investment 
funds and increased the direct dependence of CORFO on government for 
financial support and its indirect dependence on the Central Bank. 
Whenever it involved foreign credits, it made necessary to burden either 
the mining sector or the economy as a whole with additional taxes destined 
for the amortization of the dollar debt by the magnitude of the subsidy. 
This additional taxation was necessary even whenever CORFO controlled the 
equity. Repayments of foreign debts were also made by obtaining addi­
tional credits abroad. 
The Development Corporation was established, in part, to increase 
the domestic availability of commodities. More specifically, it aimed 
at raising the feasibility of investment by augmenting the availability 
of producers durables. This goal was only partially achieved because 
net foreign credits by CORFO have not been very large. Instances have 
been recorded when CORFO had started making amortization payments before 
having made use of the credit at all. Net foreign credits were ample 
during the first ten years, declined during the middle of the decade of 
the fifties, and rose in the early sixties. 
The presence of foreign credits to CORFO did, nevertheless, 
establish an investment priority system. The industries, whether pri­
vate or public, that were receiving CORFO-guaranteed foreign credits 
were able to proceed with their investment plans. Furthermore, during 
later years, these same industries were able to use scarce foreign ex­
change resources to service, maintain and expand these investments. 
Foreign credits permitted the recipients to obtain the scarce 
dollars of the country through the back door. First, without using 
export earned dollars, they imported capital goods, but subsequently 
obtained "hard" export-earned dollars through the simple means of pre­
senting to the authorities the bills for interest and amortization. 
Since the "maintenance 11 of any new industry depended on continuous future 
imports of capital goods, its establishment reduced the dollar reserves 
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available for other sectors both because of its dollar amortization pay­
ments as well as a result of payments for the replacement of capital 
goods. The dollar funds that were left over after these operations 
were then distributed (rational) among public and private investors. 
CORFO gave a preferential treatment to the enterprises it patronized, 
but diminished the investment feasibility for those left at the margin 
of the favored group, to which normally belonged the small private 
enterprises and small investors. 
In all its functions, the Development Corporation was a favored 
autonomous organization that aimed at, but rarely applied, the rules of 
private enterprise. A spectacular case of violation of these rules, and 
of inefficiency as well, is found by examining its treatment of interest 
costs. In effect, such costs on foreign credits have never heen known 
even to the Corporation (no time series are available), they were up to 
recently not included in calculating Chile's foreign debt for any future 
year, and were of little interest to the Development Corporation's 
1Finance Department. The contributions by government, which are not re-
payed and do not earn interest, and foreign credits have been treated 
as if they were of the same nature. In both, the cost of servicing is 
completely ignored (and, in most instances, CORFO does not repay either 
one). Government contributions are treated as II free goods" even though 
their social opportunity cost has been positive. During this period it 
can be said that major segments of the private sector have literally 
"starved" from lack of credit and capital goods. 
3. Revenues Originating from Own Sources 
2The third source of funds can be denominated "recuperations 11 • 
It includes moneys received from commissions, interest on and amorti­
zation of loans, sales of stocks, dividends on equity investment, sales 
of machinery, and so forth. As indicated by the last column of the 
following table, recuperations became an important source of funds in 
1
They argue that "what is important is the total debt not the 
cost of servicing it". 
2
K. H. Silvert, .£E.• cit., p. 91. 
TABLE 7 
Income From Own Sources 
(In Thousands of Escudos of Each Year) 
Year Commissions Dividends Interest Commission Sundry Subtotals Sale of
for Inspection Receipts Agricultural
of Loans Housing of Other
Funds Machiner~ 
193S ---- ---- 0.3 ---- ---- 0.3E4U 1.0 ---- 5.8 ---- o. 8 7.61941 o. 2 0.4 8.4 ---- 14. 9 24. 1 9.91942 0.2 5.3 23.3 ---- 3.6 32.3 5.51943 1. 3 5. 9 26,9 ---- 4.1 38.2 2,71944 1. 2 8.1 25.8 ---- 16,7 51. 9 2.51945 0.6 13. 5 21. 1 ---- 19. 1 54,4 1.71946 ---- 11.2 28.9 ---- 11.4 51.6 4.31%7 0.6 13. 7 42,3 ---- 5.0 61. 8 4.21948 1. 3 15.5 56.3 ---- 5.9 79. 1 8.6l 9li, 9 1. 3 20.1 18.9 NI---- 25.2 65.5 25.5 O'I1950 1. 7 29. 6 25.0 ---- 100.7 156.2 31. 5 I1951 1~ 1 88.2 82.5 0.1 30.7 202. 7 15.51952 1.4 63.6 73.9 0.5 12. 1 151.6 37. 71953 2.4 112. 6 79. 6 0.5 16.5 211. 7 25.31954 4.9 159.4 161. 5 0.8 10. 9 337.6 80. 91955 10.7 227. 6 353.9 0.8 24.1 617. 2 265.91956 11. 9 252.3 429.8 3.7 9.6 707 .4 317. 51957* 2. 9 454.8 449.4 4.6 99.8 1,011.6 94.9
1958'"'* 17. 7 659.4 542.4 2.6 124.4 1,346.5 150. 1
1959 ---- 2,423.6 694.4 - --- 21. 9
1960 ---- 2,832.0 1,612.5 ---- 30.8
1961 ---- · , 354. 4 8J.4. 7
1962 ---- 4,340.1 2,141.4
1963 ---- 4,036.9 4,783.1 
* ligures shown for 1957 correspond to receipts of the first semester only. 
** Uigures shown for 1958 correspond to those of the second semester 1957 and the first 1958. 
TN3J.E 7 (continued) 
Year Sales and Profits of Profits of Exchanges Income of SUMMARY 
Insurance Companies Refrige- New York In escudos In escudos of 
Commercia 1 and Sale of Rating Plants Office of each the first 
Section Securities Section Year Semester of 
1957 
1939 ---- ---- ---- 3.9 ---- 4.2 250.5 
1940 ---- ---- ---- 5.3 ---- 12.9 683;2 
1941 ---- ---- ---- 25.9 0.9 60.8 2,764.2 
1942 4.8 ---- ---- 32.9 1. 1 76. 7 2,474.4 
1943 10.0 - 8.1 ---- 44.9 2.1 106.1 3,119.9 
1944 23.4 3.5 ---- 43.1 2.6 127. 0 3,629.4 
194-5 1.1 8.0 ---- 52.2 1.6 119. 2 3,220.9 
1946 2.2 1. 9 ---- 47.2 1.8 180.9 2,534.4 
1947 2.5 28.9 ---- 2. 2 7.1 106. 8 1,941.8 
1948 1.3 35.1 ---- ---- ---- 123.9 1,966. 5 
1949 1. 1 11.0 0,7 8.5 ---- 112.l~ 1,561.0 N I 
1950 o. 1 ---- ---- ---- ---- 188. 0 2,210.8 -..J I 
1951 o. 5 ---- ---- o. 2 ---- 219.0 1,972.9 
1952 o. 5 1.3 5.9 4. 9 ---- 201.8 1,473.1 
1953 1.2 186.8 0.3 ---- ---- 425.4 2,517.2 
1954 3.1 203.5 2.0 ---- ---- 627 .1 2,366.6 
1955 8.2 158.8 o. 3 47.5 ---- 1,097.8 2,345.8 
1956 9.8 1,480.7 ---- 2,593.5 42.3 5,151.1 6,715.9 
19j7* 7.0 354. 1 ---- 924.4 - 13. 4 2,378.6 2,421.7 






* Figures shown fqr 1957 correspond to receipts of the first semester only.
** Figures shown for 1958 correspond to those of the second semester 1957 and the first 1958. 
Source: Finance Department of the Chilean Development Corporation (CORFO). 
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1941 and maintained their importance in later years. In 1951, recupera­
tions amounted to 20 per cent of investment funds, and in 1959 their per­
centage contribution had increased to 40 per cent. The three major com­
ponents were dividends, interest, and profits of companies and sale of 
securities. 
Dividends constituted the single most important source of these 
"own" funds. CORFO has forfeited its right to dividends payable whenever 
the debtor enterprise was engaged in an investment program that was so 
large that it required, in addition to its internal funds, major contri­
butions by CORFO itself. The National Electricity Company (ENDESA), for 
example, has not transferred dividends to CORFO even though it pays on 
its privately-owned shares. 
Interest payments constituted the first source of funds, especially 
since CORFO in the first years provided assistance primarily in the form 
of loans. It has been also an important source of funds in spite of the 
low interest rates charged and inflation, and would have been far larger 
had the credit program of CORFO not been to a large extent a subsidy pro­
gram. 
Receipts from sales of stocks fluctuated in a will-o-the-wisp 
fashion as CORFO decided erratically to sell securities. Equity sales 
were prompted partly by conviction and partly by necessity. A latent de­
sire to transfer control and ownership of successful enterprises to the 
private sector offered the philosophical justification for selling equity. 
The smallness of the capital market, however, presented an obstacle, 
especially when large equity sales were contemplated. The urgent need 
to obtain funds, which was created in the middle of the first and second 
decades, as a consequence of the diminution in copper taxes in 1945, 
and, subsequently in 1956, as a result of the anti-inflationary measures 
adopted because of the recommendations of the Klein-Sacks mission, 
obliged CORFO to obtain funds by means of sales of part of its equity 
1
holdings. In agreement with Silvert, we believe that what CORFO calls 
"profits" can be described more precisely as a II surp lus 11 • Both CORFO, 
as well as the majority of its subsidiary enterprises lack the information 
1
K. H. Silvert, .2.12.• cit., pp. 92-93. 
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needed to make an objective estimate of the real value of profits. 
Their complicated finances and inflation make such an attempt a herculean 
task. 
The Development Corporation has been a financier only in the 
narrow sense of providing funds for investment projects; and not in 
the more general sense of financing the most (or more) profitable pro­
jects, of aiming at a normal or minimum rate of return on its "capital", 
or even of aiming to recover capital extended. It can be said that such 
a behavior pattern did not violate any of its principles, but rather 
formulated them. CORFO has attempted, without success, to use objective 
and rational criteria in its financial activities with private and public 
corporations. However, the pressures, either from inside the same cor­
poration or from outside, in support of the use of objective criteria, 
have not bPen as yet strong enough, if they have existed at all. 
PART III 
Investment and Investment Criteria 
The second tool employed by CORFO to promote growth and alle­
viate the balance of payments disequilibrium has been its investment 
policy. There exists no institution, either before or after the creation 
of CORFO, which has directly controlled or indirectly affected so high a 
percentage of the country's investment in producer durables as did CORFO. 
During ten years, of the period 1940-1954, this percentage exceeded 
thirty per cent, and in five years, it was larger than forty per cent of 
the investments in machinery and equipment. 
The investment criteria adopted by CORFO can be divided into ex­
plicit, implicit, and actual. The table inserted in continuation pre­
sents the principal criteria in each category. 
Explicit criteria are defined to be those stated in the legal 
documents concerning CORFO. Implicit criteria are defined to be those 
which, for an economist, underpin the explicit ones. Finally, actual 
criteria are those that have been in effect used by CORFO in choosing 
among alternative investments. Even though there exists a correspondence 
between the explicit and implicit, in that the latter attempt to make the 
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first ones more "explicit"} there is no reason why the actual ones should 
be identified with either the explicit or the implicit ones. The first 
two sets describe the intentions of CORFOJ while the last one refers to 
its actions. The real or actual criteria are revealed by the investment 
decisions. 
Investment Criteria of C0RF0 
Exp licit Imp licit Actual 
Standard of living Social rate of return Import substitution 
criterion. criterion. criterion. 
Balance of payments Foreign exchange Import substitution in 
criterion. criterion. power} raw materials 
intermediate goods. 
Capital intensity. 
The explicit criteria utilized in establishing C0RFO and the 
criteria which C0RF0 was directed to use are those of a higher level of 
living and a balance of payments equilibrium. They appeared for the 
first time in the organic law J in which it was es.tab lished that C0RF0' s 
objectives were " ••• to elevate the standard of living of the popula­
tion and to improve the situation of the balance of international pay-
1
ments". 
These legal criteria are vagueJ especially the first of them. It 
could be said that the social rate of return and the foreign exchange 
criteria are their underlying components. Since practically any invest­
ment raises the standard of living} the problem consisted in determining 
which was the investment that contributed most to the income increase. 
In trying to solve this problem, the decisions reached by C0RF0 developed 
a rule of thumb giving birth to a "new", and specific criterion: that 
of import-substitution. 
The roots of the import-substitution criterion are found as part 
of the vague description of the additional objectives of C0RFO, namely 
1
Law 6440, Article 250J Letter a. 
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•• to aid the manufacturing industry within the country" • " 
"To propose and aid the adoption of means destined to augment the con­
sumption of national products or to obtain a greater participation of 
111Chi 1ean interests in industria. 1 and commercia· 1 · · · Eactivities. •ven so, 
in 1939, there existed little evidence that import substitution would 
be converted into ::he .3ingle most powerfu: instrument in the government I s 
development policy for r::ore thc:n two decades and that it would control 
the investment process and resou~ce allocation as well. 
In practice, the standard-of-living and balance-of-payments 
criteria were cons~dered as satisfied if an investment saved foreign 
exchange by reducing imports through competitive domestic production. 
The organic law passed over the possibility of promoting growth and 
gaining foreign exchange by means of an export-promotion policy. This 
alternative was wishfully mentioned at the end of the decade of the 
fifties, but has yet to be pursued. Neglect and omission of trade re­
flected a long tradition of trade aversion and the post-depression feeling 
that not only raw materials exports but also the export sector as a whole 
could not be trusted either to stimulate or supply the foreign exchange 
necessary for growth. 
The projects approved on the basis of the import substitution 
criterion can be grouped into three major categories: first, those 
that contributed to import substitution in the final stages of the value 
adding process, such as consumer goods manufacturing. The respective 
investments shifted the import needs of the country from the final con­
sumer goods to the intermediate, raw material, fuel, and capital goods 
categories and increased foreign exchange requirements for these groups; 
in the second category fell the projects leading to domestic production 
of fuels and raw materials, including steel, oil and electricity, which 
increased the demand for capital goods imports but saved foreign exchange 
by reducing the country's need for raw materials, fuel and intermediate 
products; finally, the third category of projects included production 
of capital goods, in particular producer durables, and normally con­
stituted the ultimate step of an import substitution leading to complete 
vertical "integration" and incorporation of industries to the domestic 
economy. These usually saved foreign exchange by reducing demand for 
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capital goods imports, especially if they produced machinery to be used 
to produce further machinery. 
Indirectly, the organic law of CORFO had excluded an import sub­
stitution effort only insofar as it referred to production of capital 
1
goods. By declaring explicitly and specifically that CORFO will aid 
11
• • • • d: • • •• the importation of machines and other elements of pro-
duction, 11 it indirectly placed the effort of import substitution on the 
two preceding categories. Since neither the level of income nor the 
degree of industrialization provided a large enough market for the pro­
duction of producer durables, and technical know-how for such ventures is 
domestically missing, the decision of CORFO was rational. Today, the 
producer durables sector is negligible, and in relative terms, not much 
larger than what it was in the terminal years of the decade of the 
thirties. 
In the other two categories import substitution was advocated 
and extensively implemented. Its effectiveness and success are eloquently 
illustrated by the unquestionable establishment of domestic-oriented 
industry aa the most important growth sector which, after a continuous 
and substantial dose of assistance has performed as desired and expected, 
namelY, better than any other sector. 
Final consumer goods are being produced today in a quantity and 
variety that compare very favorably with those of 1939. Expansion of 
this sector was achieved without substantial direct public investment. 
Import substitution was invited by such indirect stimuli as import quotas, 
tariffs, tax exemptions, easy credit and capital goods import licensing 
and so forth. With the exception of few occasions and for short periods, 
the need for direct government participation did not arise, since these 
were ventures where risk in expanding old or creating new enterprises 
was relatively low, capital requirements were within the reach of the 
private sector, and where private enterprise had already been successful. 
The actual response vindicates the view that the stimuli offered would 
be adequate. Even so, government investment has not been negligible 
and has entered more risky or complicated ventures as, for example, the 
sugar beet industry, milk processing, paper manufacturing and construction 
of hotels for tourism. 
The investments of CORFO and government have been more extensive 
and direct in the sectors of electric energy, raw materials and 
1 
capital goods are understood here to mean machinery and equipment 
and not construction. 
TABLE 8 
Investment in Contributions and Loans 
(in thousands of escudos) 
YEAR ENDESA l Government 
Railroads 
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1ENDESA - Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A. (National Electricity Corporation) 
2rANSA - Empresa Azucarera Nacional S.A. (National Sugar Industry) 
3
cAP - Compania de Acero del Pacifico (Pacific Steel Company) 
4CITAL - Comite Inmigrai;:i6n de Trabajadores America Latina (Immigration Committee of Workers., Latin America) 
TABLE 8 (continued) 
DIR.EC T L O ANS 
YEAR The Tarapaca CAP/ESVAL1 Mining Antofagasta Other Sundry Agricul- Mining Industries Commerce Comb. 
Institute of CORFO Credit Institute of Direct Alloca- ture - and 
Mining Contract System Industrial Loans tions Transport 
Development Development 
1939 ---- ---- 0.4 1. 0 
1940 1.3 ---- ---- 0.4 
1941 ---- ---- 0.8 2.1 ---- ---- 24.6 4.9 7.2 13.4 27.0 
1942 0.7 ---- -0.4 ---- ---- ---- 30.5 15.1 3.4 10.7 2. 1 
1943 0.6 ---- 0.7 -o. 1 ---- ---- 13. 7 12.8 3. 1 - 8.4 10.0 
1944 -0. 1 ---- 1. 0 o. 1 - --- ---- 1.4 5.7 o. 6 - 6.2 - 2. 8 
1945 -o. 5 ---- ---- -1. 6 ---- ---- 9.8 - 1.4 .. o. 9 - 5.9 - 3. 4 
1946 -1. 0 ---- -0.l -0. 9 ---- ---- 15.4 - 3.5 -31. 1 7.0 - 1. 9 
1947 -0.5 ---- -0. 6 ---- ---- ---- 13. 8 -11. 3 -58.9 2.3 0.9 
1948 ---- ---- -1.1 0.3 ---- ---- 10.0 - 3.3 22,8 2.1 - 6.9 
1949 ---- ---- -0. 6 0.5 ---- ---- 3.8 -12.3 -261. 8 2.2 -. 4. 9 
1950 ---- ---- -0.4 ---- 219.3 53.4 
1951 ---- 25. 0 ---'"'I: ---- 31.8 5.9 
1952 ---- 25.0 ---- ---- 9. 4 5. 1 
1953 ---- 25.0 ---- ---- 113.7 65. 4 
1954 ---- 12. 0 ---- ---- 51. 5 87.6 
1955 ---- 87. 0 ---- ---- -17. 0 19. 1 
1956 ---- ---- ---- ---- -96. 9 499.9 
1957 ---- ---- ---- ---- 441. 7 1) 149.4 
1958 
1959 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 1,970.0 1,250.0 1,530.0 
1960 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 4,115.7 1,355.0 2, 807. 2 
---- ---- ---- 11,180.1 3,770.0 8,868.01961 ---- ---- ----
6,618.6 3,700.0 5,884.51962 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- (1) ---- (2) 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 7,953.1 4,133.1 4,864.51963 ----
1964 
Notes: 
1ESVAL - Empresa Siderurgica de Valdivia (The Valdivia Iron Company) 
I 
The figures on the direct loans uJFigures preceded by the sign - refer to sales or reduction in ·holdings. +' 
preceded by a minus sign refer to sales of shares. 
I 
(2) Incl: in Mining(1) Incl: in lndustries 
Source: Finance Section, CORFO, Unpublished Material. 
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intermediate products. The three projects that stand out in terms 
of investment outlays in this category are hydroelectric power, steel and 
oil. In the appendix, these projects, and that of sugar beet produc­
tion, are briefly described and analyzed because they shed light into the 
investment policy of CORFO and also because they represent the bulk of 
CORFO's expenditures. Both the oil and steel industry were new ventures 
explicitly established to compete with imports. The hydroelectric plants 
and distribution facilities reflected an independent expansion of·the 
existing network and indirectly reduced the country's fuel needs. 
Other investments in the line of raw materials and intermediate 
products included construction materials, copper refining, the rayon in­
dustry, cement, refrigeration plants, textile fibers and so forth. 
Government policy promoted domestic vertical integration by adding to 
the existing consumer goods sector a wide range of intermediate and 
raw material industries. Government entry, through CORFO, in these lines 
of production was natural. Given that capital requirements were often 
extremely high and that there also existed desirea to prevent foreign 
control of these industries, government investment became the natural 
choice. 
The investments of CORFO were divided into two principal categories: 
investments in contributions and loans, which are· presented in table 8, 
and direct (equity) investments which are presented in table 9. The first 
category does not represent equity investment and repayment of the loan 
is normally expected. If, at a later date, instead of cash CORFO received 
shares in repayment of the debt, the original contributions or loans are 
reclassified as direct investments. As a consequence, table 9 occasionally 
duplicates information of the previous table. The value of these tables 
resides more in the fact that they give an idea of the relative importance 
of the various investments than i.n the absolute values, which appear 
partially distorted by the rampant inflation. 
As already mentioned, 
1 
the principal criterion used by CORFO has 
been that of import substit~tion. In table 10 which follows, are given 
the II savings II in dollars generated by the four major industries supported 




Direct Investments b1 CORFO 
(in thousand of escudos) 
CONTRI BUTI ONS 
Year Private Public ENDESA C A P 
Comoanies Companies 
1939 5. 0 
1940 2.3 3.7 
1941 12.9 34.9 
1942 23.1 71. 9 
1943 4.8 103. 1 
1944 13.4 552.4 
1945 11. 7 16.8 
1946 5.9 138.1 
1947 13. 7 14. L~ 
1948 3.6 164.3 
1949 9.7 387.6 
1950 10. 9 42.4 785.5 155.0 
1951 0.6 40. 9 1,700.0 46.5 
1952 40. 0 29.1 0.2 46.5 
1953 45. 2 165.8 778. 5 396. 0 
1954 11.3 189.2 1,183.7 
1955 76.8 189. 6 7 06. 8 949. 0 
1956 129. 4 291.7 2,037. 0 2,193.6 







Notes: ENDESA - National Electricity Corporation 
CAP - Pacific Steel Company 
IANSA - National Sugar Industry 
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4, 37 o. 7 
653.2 
(Service of Mechanized 
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Table 9 (continued) 
I N V E S T M E N T S AND S T U D I E s 
Year ENAP Investments Soda Ash Pupunahue Mechanization Mechanical 








1945 162. 0 
1946 41. 9 
1947 106. 9 o. 8 
1948 147 .4 o. 1 
1949 558.4 -387.6 o. 1 
1950 321. 6 - 42.4 
1951 370. 0 19.3 
1952 500. 0 0.3 1. 9 63.1 
1953 485.2 64.9 o. 9 
1954 1,419.9 32.0 
1955 293.7 326.2 194. 0 
1956 124.8 713. 8 516.5 47.2 
1957 4,164.8 1,880.5 1,268.0 197. 3 
1958 178. 9 764.9 100. 5 
1959 ---- 310. 1 32.9 231. 6 
1960 276.9 26,4 88.1 
1961 26.3 19. Li-
1962 13.4 
1963 27.8 
Notes: ENAP - Empresa Nacional de Petroleo, S.A. (National Oil Enterprise). 
Source: Department of Finance, CORFO. 
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by CORFO. 
Since the terminology err-ployed in the discussion of import sub­
stitution is rather vague, some clarifications are made here. An enter­
prise established on the basis of the import substitution criterion 
creates dollar 11 savings11 if the sum of the value of its exports and pro­
duction for the domestic market exceeds the sum of its current dollar 
expenditures and the servicing costs of long-term foreign debt. An in­
dustry 11 earns 11 dollars, or generates dollar 11 earnings 11 , if the value of 
its exports exceeds its current dollar expenditures plus the cost of 
servicing its long-run dollar debt. 
The notion of 11 saving" dollars is a rather dubious one, since 
every domestic industry 11 saves 11 dollars by producing goods which, as 
a consequence, do not need to be imported, and, therefore, be paid for 
in dollars. It is a notion referring to a conditional event and as such 
very vague. By the same token, it can be said that an industry "spends" 
dollars if, as a result of its lack of growth, the economy spends dollars 
to import commodities that this industry could have produced. Thus, while 
investment in the steel industry permits the economy to save11 around11 
$60 million, this and other similar investments, at the same time, force 
the economy to 11 spend11 $100 million to import agricultural products which 
could have been saved had investments taken place in agriculture rather 
than in steel production. Thus, unless such "savings 11 can be measured 
per unit of investment for different sectors and industries the "net 
or overall saving11 of foreign exchange for the economy as a result of an 
investment cannot be calculated. Net saving would occur if the per unit 
of investment decline in imports is greater than the increase of imports 
as a result of omitting to invest a unit in another sector. 
The notion of dollar "earnings" per unit of investment is re­
latively more clear and has a higher operational value than that re­
ferring to dollar II saving11 • If an industry contributes more per unit of 
investment to dollar revenue earnings than to dollar expenditures it 
has "dollar earnings". As far as the balance of payments is concerned, 
An industry makes a clearly "positive" contribution only if its dollar 
(export) revenues exceed its dollar expenditures (direct and indirect). 
An economy runs into trouble, as in the case of Chile, if practically 
all investments lead to dollar "savings" but none or very few lead to 
11 earnings" of dollars. Obviously, it is possible that more investrr:ent 
TABLE 10 
Savings of Dollars Generated hr Selected Entererises 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Accounting Savings Accounting Savings Accounting Savings Accounting Savings 
Period Generated Period Generated Period Generated Period Generated 
by Steel by Oil by Sugar by the 
Industry Industry Beet Indus- Electric 
(CAP) (1) (ENAP) (2) try Power Indus-
(IANSA) (3) try (ENDESA (4)) 
1953 12.5 1953 5.8 
1954 18.8 1954 1. 3 1954 0.4 
1955 18.6 1955 7.2 1955 0.6 
1956-57 26.0 1956 1st sem. 7.3 1956 1. 1 
1957-58 24.7 1956-57 8.1 1957 3.3 
1958-59 31.0 1957-58 9.4 1958 3.0 
16.81959-60 23.5 1958-59 8.9 1959 4.0 1959 
I1960-61 28.0 1959-60 14.4 1960 5.6 1960 15.0 w
1961-62 43.1 196 0-61 14. 0 1961 2.7 B61 20.0 ~I 
1962-63 56.8 1961-62 23.5 1962 5.3 1962 20.0 
1963-64 68.5 1962-63 32.4 1963 19.4 
1963 2nd sem. 25.4 
Total saving Total saving Tota 1 saving 
since ENAP' s since IANSA' ssince CAP' s 
establishment 389.6 establishment 121.8 establishment 45.2 
Sources and Notes: 
(1) CAP stands for Co~pania de Acero del Pacifico S,A. The information on dollar savings has been 
obtained from the company's yearbooks. Total saving was calculated by the company itself and 
is not the sum of the figures presented in the table since some years are missing. 
Dollar saving figures throughout the table(2) ENAP stands for Errpresa Nacional del Petr6leo S.A. 
have been rounded off. Savings of this column have been calculated by taking the difference 
between the dollar-equivalent of ENAP's total sales and its actual dollar expenditures, which 
include all interr.ational payments. Expenditures for the establishment of the oil industry 
Sales of output began in 1950 and by 1955 the dollar value of output exceededstarted as early is 1942. 
-40-
TABLE 10 (continued) 
Sources and Notes: 
(2) (continued) 
the international dollar payments. Remarkable as this performance 
may be, it conceals the fact that crude petroleum imports to 
Chile, which started in 1955, did not decline but rather increased 
in absolute value, even though they have declined dramatically 
to 20 per cent of total consumption. The negative values for 1953 
and 1954 indicate that international dollar payments for ENAP's 
operations exceeded its sales income. 
(3) IANSA stands for Industria Azucarera Nacional S.A. Calculation 
of dollar savings is not completely correct since it does not 
take account the cost of servicing foreign credits as a com­
ponent of dollar expenditures. The resulting error, nevertheless 
is minor, since the total value of these credits has been small. 
The information required to correct this error has not been 
available. 
(4) ENDESA stands for Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A. Savings 
have been crudely calculated as the difference between the dollar 
value of its sales and ENDESA's current dollar expenditures. 
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is directed toward industries creating dollar "savings" than toward in­
dustries creating dollar earnings; thenJ both revenues and expenditures 
of dollars would decline either in absolute value or as a percentage 
of total income, but the former more rapidly than the latter. In the 
case of Chile it is doubtful that investments over time have led to an 
overall import substitution, which would be evidenced by a decline of 
1imports as a per cent of gross national product , let alone to dollar 
earnings. 
While the import substitution policy of CORFO was successful 
as far as industrial products and fuels are concerned, it was a failure 
of omission as far as agricultural exports or imports are concerned. 
Net agricultural imports have thus increased from $7.6 millionJ in 1942, 
to $83 million, in 1962, as a result of a narrow interpretation of the 
import substitution criterion both with respect to time as well as sectors 
affected. The time horizon rarely exceeded the present, and normally, 
interest was confined to the industrial sector and electric power. 
Before closing this section it is worth giving an overall evaluation 
of CORFO' s investment policies. 
We have already seen that ~ithin a general framework, the objec­
tives of CORFO were, first 1 to obtain a higher level of living and, 
second, to achieve equilibrium in the balance of payments. 
The second objective was never attained, since from the beginning 
the means for achieving it were insufficient. Equilibrium could be 
attained by (a) raising exports or (b) decreasing imports. The de facto 
chosen alternative was the second and the policy was only partially 
successful. 
Insofar as it aimed ~t domestic production of previously im­
ported commodities, the policy of achieving balance of payments equilib­
rium was successful. Chile produces now a variety of commodities that 
has radically changed the composition of the industrial sector, and 
fares well in comparison to some other less developed nations. However, 
the policy was only partial and ignored or neglected two elements 
1
An important aiw of Chile 1 s import substitution policy was to 









1fundamental to any trade policy. Indirectly, traditional exports were 
put at a disadvantage either because of discriminatory taxation and 
foreign exchange policies, as in the case of the copper industry, or 
because of inflation and administrative inertia, as in the case of agricul­
ture, forestry and tourism. Some exports declined, and in extreme in 4 
2stances, commodities normally exported were now heavily imported. 
Most of the new products are not export-oriented and place a 
strain on foreign exchange reserves by requiring capital goods and raw 
material imports, and frequently, servicing of capital imports. In 
1965, the country found itself in an even more serious balance of pay­
3ments disequilibrium than in 1940 and a matching desire to eliminate it. 
With respect to its first objective, C0RFO has been more success­
ful. It appears that per capita income has grown at an average rate of 
one per cent per year since 1940, largely because of substantial pro­
ductivity gains in practically all sectors. C0RFO did not nevertheless 
succeed in raising the level of investment. In spite of its efforts, 
Chile has had the lowest value of the investment coefficient in Latin 
America. 
The very important social objective of a more equal income dis­
tribution was bypassed in letter as well as in practice during the first 
twenty-five years of operation of the Development Corporation. 
1
In determining the "foreign exchange saving" component of alter­
native investment options, the potential constellation of future consumer 
goods imports as a result of present investment policies was not taken 
into account. Even today, with heavy agricultural imports, the import 
substitution criterion has not been supplied in favor of agriculture. 
2
This is true with various agricultural products. 
3
The balance of payments problem is equally acute in 1967 as it 
was in 1965. 
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CONCLUSION 
At the end of the twenty-five years of life of the Development 
Corporation, the Chilean economy can claim substantial progress. Per 
capita income growth returned, after the depression years, to its his­
torical rate of increase of one per cent per year, a figure that is 
not spectacular but also not insignificant. Any conjecture about the 
contribution of CORFO to this performance or about a potentially better 
one had CORFO not existed would take us out of the realm of reality. 
The country possesses now a steel, oil and sugar beet industry, a 
publicly owned electricity network and numerous other medium or minor 
enterprises in the area of industrial raw materials, intermediate and 
final products, all as a result of the efforts of CORFO. Import sub­
stitution and industrialization have not included the crucial producer 
durables sector, which is still locally missing, and the domestic presence 
of which would have made Chile a "complete" economic system, capable of 
entering a path of self-sustained growth with the assistance of its own 
capital goods sector, and without dependence on imports of machinery and 
equipment. 
However) even though since 1939 the dependence on industrial con­
sumer goods, intermediate products, fuel and some imports of raw materials 
from other nations has been reduced, the lopsided development pattern of 
the country has contributed to an increased dependence on agricultural 
consumer goods and producer durables imports. 
The balance of payments disequilibrium in 1965, and even in 1967, 
shows a marked deterioration over that of 1939, leaving completely un­
fulfilled the second principal objective of CORFO. The type of dependence 
of Chile in relation to the outside world has changed, shifting towards 
food and machinery, and its efforts towards greater economic "independence" 
have not succeeded; actually dependence has increased. Since the possi­
bility of obtaining a domestic producer durables sector is remote, the 
future of the country lies in its efforts to augment its exports in 
general and to import less food products. It still remains to be seen 
whether the economy and CORFO alike can overcome a traditional aversion 





No industrialization was conceivable without electrification and 
this was the reason why government simultaneously formulated plans for 
both in 1939. In 1945, the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A. (ENDESA) 
was formally established, a subsidiary of CORFO, to pursue the fulfill­
ment of this program as the single entity controlling public power in 
Chile. Investment in hydroelectric power, in terms of funds allocated, 
has been the most important one undertaken by CORFO. Up to 1958, it 
had absorbed more than $78 million of foreign credits, which is approxi­
mately equivalent to 27 per cent of such credits received by CORFO, and 
approximately 30 per cent of its total resources invested. 
In 1939, the climate was highly favorable for a government­
sponsored and controlled electrification program. Supply had increased 
very slowly since 1930 and shortages were highly conspicuous. Electri­
fication of the country on the basis of an interconnected system was a 
necessity since the geographic and economic characteristics had created 
a shortage in the Center and excess capacity in the South. Furthermore, 
electrification was not only a precondition for industrial development, 
but also for the cultural, social and even political advance of the 
rural areas. Heavy capital requirements and prolonged periods of low 
profitability made it a natural target for government ownership. The 
import substitution criterion was not forgotten when this investment 
was chosen; it was pointed out that needs for fuel imports would be 
reduced (the petroleum industry had not yet been developed), and also, 
that the import component per unit of investment in hydroelectric power 
was far below this component in investment in thermic power. 
The capital-output ratio of ENDESA during 1959-62 fluctuated 
around 7. O. It is likely that this ratio had been even higher during 
earlier years when more projects had not reached gestation. The im­
pact of ENDESA's activities is measured by the following facts. The 
relative share of hydroelectric energy, in total energy consumed, in­
creased from 11.6 per cent in 1940, to 24.7 per cent in 1950. Per 
capita consumption almost doubled. ENDESA supplied 34.4 per cent of 
total electric energy generated in 1960. Furthermore, it employed 
6008 persons in 1959, and 5886 persons in 1962 at a cost of $27,200 
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and $32,400 per employee investment respectively. During the period 
TABLE 
Capital Stock and Income Statistics for ENDESA. Selected Years 
(In Thousand of U.S. Dollars) 
Capital Stock Income (output) Capital/Output 
1959 163,643 23,068 7. 09 
1960 155,104 21,179 7.32 
1961 166,909 25,236 6.61 
1962 202,926 25,697 7.90 
Source: Calculated by the author from information contained 
in Memoria de Actividades, Ano 1962, ENDESA (Santiago, Chile: 
ENDESA), 1963. 
1959-62 ENDESA did not finance more than 25 per cent of its yearly invest­
ments with its own funds, even though its rate of return over capital 
was 4.39 per cent in 1959, 2.99 per cent in 1960, 4.63 per cent in 1961, 
and 4.08 per cent in 1962. CORFO still contributes annually more than 
$10 million. The company hopes that, with more favorable pricing 
policies of electric power self-financing could rise rapidly. During 
1959 and 1962, the import component of the investments undertaken by 
ENDESA has ranged between 13.1 and 15.8 per cent. The company mentions 
the inadequate government pricing policies and the extremely low bud­
getary appropriations as factors limiting its growth. 
THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 
The Pacific Steel Company (Compania de Acero del Pacifico 
(C.A.P.), S.A.), operator of the El Algarrobo iron ore mine and the 
Huachipato steel plant, had established itself, on its fifteenth anni­
versary, in 1964, as a highly successful vertically integrated industry. 
Imports of steel products which it fabricates have been totally 
replaced by national ones and its productivity has been very high. In 
addition, the firm enjoys high profits, has successfully entered export 
markets and within the given constraints, has grown at a maximum rate. 
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The Chilean steel industry was established to 11 save11 dollars, 
i.e., to replace imports, not to earn them, i.e., to export. As an in­
ternally-oriented industry, it constitutes a highly successful case of 
import-substitution. It has "saved" the country more than $350 million 
dollars since its inception, and, in addition, it has "earned" more than 
$50 million dollars through exports. Chile, with its rich reserves of 
iron ore, and limestone and fair deposits of coal is a natural steel 
producer. Before CAP was organized and established under the auspices 
of CORFO, the internal activities were limited to a few small rolling 
mills producing limited tonnages of reinforcing bars and merchant pro­
ducts. 
The capital-output ratio has declined over the years as the 
Huachipato plant reached record output levels. 
TABLF ·y 
Capital Stock and Income Statistics for C.A. P. Selected Years 
(In Millions of u. s. Dollars) 
Capital Outeut Caeital/Outeut 
June 1959 lll..4 1958/59 31.0 3.6 
June 1960 138. 7 59/60 23.5 5.9 
June 1962 168.2 61/62 43.1 3.9 
June 1963 169. 5 62/63 56.8 3.0 
June 1964 173.1 63/64 68.5 2.5 
Notes: Output is defined as the dollar sales value of CAP minus 
the dollar value of all current international payments such as raw 
material imports, and interest and amortization payments. This procedure 
was chosen because the information that would permit a more accurate 
calculation of value added was not available. In particular since I had 
no information about domestic intermediate payments, I assumed that the 
error of not incorporating them was compensated by the error of ex­
cluding interest payments abroad from value added. The trend in the 
capital-output ratio is depicted correctly in column three, as long as the 
percentage importance of payments to intermediate imputs in total ex­
penditures has remained stable. 
Source: Memoria Anual Compania de Acero del Pacifico, Various 
issues. 
As of June 1964, the industry offered employment to 6,404 persons, 
at an average investment of $27,000, and enjoyed a rate of return on 
capital of 7.3 per cent. Among the four major industries originated by 
CORFO, CAP is the only one with substantial exports and an even greater 
potential. The export market absorbed 18 per cent of its output in 1951, 
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20 per cent in 1955, 42 per cent in 1956/57, and 54 per cent in 1957/58. 
Exports, directed to Argentina, Peru, other Latin American countries, 
and even the U.S.A. had a residual character: exported was whatever 
the domestic market would not buy at international prices (the price 
policy was not to charge more than what equivalent imports would have 
cost). The high level of exports reached in 1956 and 1957 was made 
possible by the severe domestic depression and the contraction in house 
building, Domestic demand at going prices is, thus, by no means un­
limited but international markets can apparently absorb any quantity 
produced in the near future. 
The industry has maintained its accounts and balances in dollars, 
thus avoiding the confusion generated in an inflation2ry environment, 
unfortunately without being imitated. The steel, like the petroleum 
industry, is constrained in its expansion by the foreign exchange bottle­
neck, It could become a major export industry and thus shift away the 
investment feasibility bottleneck, which blocks numerous enterprises, by 
"earning" rather than only saving dollars. 
As soon as it started its activities, CORFO realized that if it 
were to successfully proceed with a plan of industrialization, it was 
indispensable to solve the problem of domestic fuel supply. Attention 
was focused on the oil industry for two fundamental reasons. The first, 
strictly of an economic nature, related to the economy of foreign ex­
change that a national oil industry would generate; the second, con­
sisted in that the security of the country would benefit with self­
sufficiency of liquid fuels in case of international conflict. Oil 
production was also a sign of development, a proof of success, an in­
strument of power and a source of riches that to most underdeveloped 
nations is even more attractive than the possession of a steel industry, 
and, besides, in many instances more profitable. 
1
The present section is based on material found in Memoria Anual 
1961, 1962, 1963, EMPRESA NACIONAL DEL PETROLEO (Santiago, Chile: Cor­
poraci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n); Boletin Estadistica, 1963 ENAP; 
CORFO, Labor Realizada Entre los Anos 19h2-1956, mimeo, 1957, and un­




The Chilean efforts to produce oil have been justified. In 1950, 
the Nationa 1 Petroleum Enterprise (Empresa Naciona 1 del Petr6leo, 11 ENAP 11 ) 
was created as a CORFO subsidiary after a long period of explorations. 
Between 1942 and 1963, dollar expenditures on this venture had reached 
$242.2 million and, even though production started only in 1950, by 
1963 the oil industry had contributed to net dollar savings of almost 
$122 million. The import substitution process was carried through 
from the level of crude oil production (1950) to refining (1955). 
The industry has been highly efficient, innovating, productive 
and profitable. As shown by the following information, its capital­
output ratio is rather high but declined substantially between 1962 and 
1963. Employment was 3,331 persons in 1962, and 3,273 in 1963, at an 
TABLE 
Capital Stock and Income Statistics for ENAP, 1962 and 1963 
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Date Capital Q~ Capital/Output 
June 1962 126. 3 23.5 5.37 
June 1963 130.3 32. ~- 4.02 
Source: Calculated by the author from information provided by 
ENAP. 
average per employee capital investment of $38,100, and $39,800 re­
1
spectively. Gas production rose from 4.430 m3 in 1949, to 5,155,460 
m3 in 1963. ENAP has exported propane and butane to Argentina, Brazil 
and Africa (a total of around $5 million between 1954-63). 
As an enterprise providing substitutes for imports ENAP has been 
very successful. In 1960 it supplied 61.84% of total consumption, and 
in 1963, 72.6 per cent. Although the share of imported oil products 
has fallen sharply, their absolute value has increased between 19Lf0 
and 1963, or 1950 and 1963. The share of crude oil imported in total 
oil refined has fallen from 55.7 per cent in 1955 to 18.7 per cent in 
1963, while in absolute terms the quantity of cruc'.e oil imported increased 




continued oil product imports is that Chilean oil is "light" having a 
high gasoline content and it is therefore necessary to use "heavy" oil 
to satisfy the rising demand for kerosene, diesel oil and special fuels. 
Known oil reserves, expected to last only until 1970, are confined to 
the Isla de la Tierra del Fuego and a small strip of land adjoining 
Argentina. 
ENAP has been recently handicapped by two major problems. The 
first arises from its "inability" to reinvest its profits. It has tried 
to purchase dollars from the Central Bank but to no avail. The funds 
which ENAP wanted to but "could" not reinvest because of dollar scarcity, 
were 16. 7 per cent of its capital stock, and 104. 2 per cent of its "in­
come" in 1964. These percentages would have been higher had the real 
TABLE 
Infeasible Investment or Frustrated Savings of ENAP. Selected Years 
Unuti lized Income "Infeasible" 
Disposable (Value added Investment "Infeasible" 
Funds Capital by ENAP) as% of Investment 
Thousands Thousands Thousands Capital as% of 
U.S. Dollars U.S. Dollars U.S. Dollars Stock. Income. 
A B C D A 
B E=~ 
June 1962 7,824 126,280 1961/62 23,492 5.9% 33.3% 
June 1963 21,870 130,341 1962/63 32,417 9.1% 67.5% 
June 1964 52,827 134,032 1963/64 50,712 16. 7% 104. 2% 
Note: Columns A and Bare the dollar equivalents of these variables 
as given in the balance sheets of ENAP. Conversion was made at the 
officia 1 exchange rate. Column C has been obtained by deducting from the 
dollar value of the sales of ENAP its dollar international expenditures 
in the same year. Since ENAP is a vertically integrated industry, except 
for the imported crude oil, this procedure is rather accurate. Income 
for 1963/64 period was obtained by daub ling the income figure of the 
second semester of 1963. 
value of its bank deposits not declined each year as a result of inflation. 
The officials of ENAP lament this loss but appeEr unable to establish 
the circumstances that would facilitate the conversion of funds and 
savings into machinery and equipment. This microeconomic evidence sup­
ports the "feasibility" of investment doctrine which claims that countries 
with scarce foreign exchange resources, such as Chile, possess the savings 
but are unable to convert them into investment because the economy is 
either unable or unwilling to pay for capital goods imports. As far as 
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ENAP was concerned, the domestic market and the existing level of de­
mand permitted almost unlimited expansion. Saving by the industry 
presented no problem either since profits were high and also own funds 
had been accumulated. The bottleneck they faced was related to the in­
feasibility of the investment, which arose from the lack of domestic 
supply of the necessary producer durables and the inelastic supply of 
foreign exchange and imported capital goods. 
Exploitation of oil deposits was entrusted in Chile to a wholly 
government owned autonomous enterprise. In terms of efficiency, the 
record of this public enterprise is outstanding and by all means 
superior to the record of the government-owned enterprise in Argentina. 
Although the Chilean Oil Company relied on the technical assistance of 
United States experts, its long-run success has been predominantly the 
result of Chilean, public sector talents. It has thus demonstrated 
that even in the difficult field of oil exploration and exploitation 
national factors of production, and even the public sector are present 
and capable of undertaking the most difficult tasks. In a way, the very 
success of ENAP was the result of its nationa 1 rather than foreign 
character which saved it from being stigmatized as an imperialist 
monopoly, and possibly discriminated against. Chile saved substantial 
foreign exchange reserves by not having to pay foreign factors of pro­
duction for its ventures in the oil industry. 
THE SUGAR BEET INDUSTRYl 
As early as 1854 a Frenchman, by the name of Ducaud, attempted 
to establish a joint stock company with the intention of exploiting 
sugar beet production, but his activities had no success. The sub­
sequent recurrent attempts to establish sugar beet factories went beyond 
1Tht following sources were used for this section. Memoria v 
Balance Industria Azucarera Nacional. Various years (Santiago, Chile: 
Industria Azucarera Nacional S.A.). Boletin Remolachero (Santiago, Chile: 
Industria Azucarera Nacional) Various issues. "IANSA y la Agricultura 
de Chi le", Panorama Econ6mico, December 23, 1955, No. 137, "IANSA dio 
la Voz de Partida a su Tercera Planta de Azucar de Betarraga", ~., 
April 18, 1958, No. 187. 
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this step. In some instances sugar was produced for some years, but 
at the end they failed. 
CORFO started in 1939 contemplating the possibility of establishing 
a national sugar beet industry, concentrating its first efforts in pre­
paring the necessary studies. In 1945 was initiated an experimental 
program with the cooperation of local functionaries and farmers. Once 
this was completed, there was formed the Industria Azucarera Nacional 
S.A. (IANSA) in 1953. The industrial cultivation of sugar beets started 
in 1954 in Los Angeles, where the first plant was constructed. In 1958 
and 1959, two more were built in Llanquihue and Linares with which the 
combined domestic capacity to produce sugar rose to 110,000 tons annually. 
The principal criterion employed by CORFO in establishing the 
National Sugar Industry was that of import substitution. In effect, 
sugar imports were claiming a high share of dollar resources in 1939, 
and unless checked, this dollar drain would be increasing as population 
and income increased. In addition, IANSA was established to promote 
and develop agriculture and livestock by means of sugar beet cultivation. 
In the pursuit of its objectives the industry has been relatively success­
ful. In 1954, its production of sugar reflected 2.1 per cent of national 
consumption and, by 1964, this proportion had increased approximately to 
40 per cent. It gained the third place in the world ranking of countries 
producing beet sugar with respect to productivity per hectare. Further­
more, it provided full-time yearly employment to 7,200 persons in­
cluding farmers, blue- and white-collar workers, at an average capital 
investment per person employed of 3,400 dollars. 
The capital-output ratio has fallen over the years and reached 
a low point of 1.24 in 1963. In the same year the industry approached 
full capacity production and the value of output, which is measured by 
international prices rather than domestic cost, benefited from excep­
tionally high prices. The cost of production of a kilogram of sugar 
by IANSA, in 1964, was 25 cents and obviously substantially higher than 
the international price. 
IANSA has been an exception in the government's policy in the 
forties and fifties of neglecting agriculture. But even so, in 1961, 
it experiences a substantial decline in production and acreage cultivated, 
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TABLE 
Capital Stock and Output Statistics for IANSA, 1962, 1963 
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Year Capital Output Capital-output 
Stock Ratio 
1962 23 5.3 4.34 
Aug. 1963 24 19.4 1.24 
Note: Calculated by the author on the basis of published in-
formation presented in earlier references. 
when government fixed irrationally low prices to farmers. Furthermore, 
although its expansion is both profitable and dollar-saving, government 
has not provided dollar and domestic funds for the building of new 
plants. 
The contribution of the industry to agriculture has been substantial. 
It was established in regions where small cultivators predominate, since 
sugar beet cultivation requires intensive farming, heavy labor inputs 
and continuous care. An agricultural extension system was established, 
farmers were trained, roads and transport were developed, and agricul"­
tura l soil was improved. Dollars were saved because of reduced sugar 
imports and the increased domestic production of meat, milk and butter 
through the use of the "industry's" byproducts. Agricultural productivity 
in the areas involved reached high levels. 
